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CASE LAW
A. Court of Justice
Quantitative Easing at the Court of Justice – Doing whatever it takes to
save the euro:Weiss and Others
Case C-493/17,Weiss and Others, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of
11 December 2018, EU:C:2018:1000.
1. Introduction
The unconventional monetary policy activities of the European Central Bank
have played a significant role in tackling the euro crisis and stabilizing the
euro area. They have also, however, triggered a fierce debate about both the
position of the ECB in the EU’s constitutional system and the proper role of
courts in supervising independent institutions. This debate is the context for
the ECJ’s Weiss decision, handed down in response to the second ever
preliminary reference of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court) to the ECJ. That its first ever reference also concerned
an earlier ECB programme provides the Weiss decision with an additional
significance. By framing its reference through the lenses and safeguards
established by the ECJ in its earlier Gauweiler decision, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht not only sought a clarification of EU law, but also
engaged in an open challenge to the ECJ as to whether it is willing to act
consistently in reviewing ECB action.
In delivering its judgment, the ECJ indeed anchors its reasoning in
numerous standards elaborated in its earlier Gauweiler ruling. In doing so,
however, it struggles with many of the unique features of the ECB’s later
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), such as its (in)transparency, the
scale of the securities purchased, and the programme’s economic effects.
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that PSPP is a proportionate programme
that both fits within the ECB’s monetary mandate and respects the prohibition
on monetary financing provided under Article 123(1) TFEU. It is now for the
Bundesverfassungsgericht to determine whether this interpretation breaches
its ultra vires standard of review.
Common Market Law Review 56: 1005–1040, 2019.
© 2019 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
In this case note, the judgment is analysed according to some of the
difficulties faced by the ECJ in reconciling PSPP with constitutional
standards. The judgment particularly illustrates the ECJ’s reluctance to
engage in intensive and meaningful proportionality review, demonstrating
some of the difficulties in grounding such review in procedural devices (or a
thin duty to state reasons). In spite of these limitations, the Court’s reply,
demonstrates lasting advantages (as well as some pitfalls) of the preliminary
reference procedure.
2. Factual and legal background to the dispute
2.1. The Public Sector Purchase Programme
On 22 January 2015, the ECB’s Governing Council initiated a secondary
markets PSPP in response to strong downward pressure on inflation in the
euro area.1 The PSPP formed part of the ECB’s extended asset purchase
programme (APP) alongside the asset-backed securities purchase programme
(ABSSP), the third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) (both
introduced in September 2014), and the corporate sector purchase programme
(introduced in March 2016).2 Altogether, the ECB anticipated that these asset
purchase programmes would serve to ease financial and monetary conditions
and support a return to a 2 percent inflation rate in the medium-term, thus
contributing to the ECB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability.3
Decision 2015/774 of the ECB of 4 March 2015 formalized the PSPP and
outlined its features, amended by Decisions 2015/2101,4 2015/2404,5
2016/7026 and 2017/100.7 As the PSPP currently stands, a number of features
distinguish it from the ECB’s never operationalized Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) programme. Under the PSPP, Eurosystem central banks
can purchase euro-denominated securities issued by “… central, regional or
local governments of a Member State whose currency is the euro, recognized
1. ECB Decision 2015/774 of 4 Mar. 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset
purchase programme, O.J. 2015, L 121/20, Recital 3.
2. ECB Decision 2017/100 of 11 Jan. 2017 on amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a
secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, O.J. 2017, L 16/51, Recital 1.
3. Ibid., Recital 4.
4. ECB Decision 2015/2101 of 5 Nov. 2015 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a
secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, O.J. 2015, L 303/106.
5. ECB Decision 2015/2464 of 16 Dec. 2015 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a
secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, O.J. 2015, L 344/1.
6. ECB Decision 2016/702 of 18 Apr. 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a
secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, O.J. 2016, L 121/24.
7. Decision 2017/100, cited supra note 2.
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agencies located in the euro area, international organizations located in the
euro area and multilateral development banks”.8 Eligible securities must have
a remaining maturity of between 1 and 30 years at their time of purchase and
come from an issuer with a credit quality assessment of at least Step 3 in the
Eurosystem’s harmonized rating scale.9 The ECB also allows for a blackout
period, to be determined by the Governing Council, during which no eligible
securities may be bought.10 In contrast, under the OMT, only assets of
countries participating in a macroeconomic adjustment programme under the
European Stability Mechanism, and with a maturity of between 1 and 3 years,
were eligible for purchase.11
The PSPP limits the amount of shares the Eurosystem can hold of any one
security.12 In terms of portfolio allocations, 10 percent of eligible securities
should be towards securities issued by eligible international organizations and
multilateral development banks, and the remaining 90 percent towards all
other eligible issuers.13 PSPP also provides for a sharing of securities between
the national and EU levels, with Eurosystem central banks taking a 90 percent
share of eligible securities with the remaining 10 percent purchased by the
ECB, and distribution according to the subscription key of the ECB’s
capital.14 According to the ECB’s Governing Council, a risk-sharing regime
applies to 20 percent of additional asset purchases, with each member central
bank responsible for its own risks regarding the remaining 80 percent of
purchases.15
Initially, combined monthly purchases under the APP were authorized to
the amount of EUR 60 billion.16 This amount was increased to EUR 80 billion
in April 2016 and decreased again to EUR 60 billion from April 2017
8. Decision 2015/2464, cited supra note 5, Art. 1(1), amending Decision 2015/774
Art. 3(1).
9. Decision 2016/702, cited supra note 6, Art. 1(1), amending Decision 2015/774 Art. 3(2);
Art. 3(3).
10. Decision 2015/774, cited supra note 1, Art. 4(1).
11. ECB, Press Release: Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions, 6 Sept.
2012 <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html> (last visited 25 Jan.
2019).
12. Decision 2016/702, cited supra note 6, Art. 1(1)(2), amending Decision 2015/774
Art. 5.
13. Ibid., Art. 1(3), amending Decision 2015/774 Art. 6(1).
14. Ibid., Art. 1(4), amending Decision 2015/774 Art. 6(2).
15. ECB, Press Release: ECB Adds Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) to the
Asset Purchase Programme (APP) and Announces Changes to APP, 10 Mar. 2016 <www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310_2.en.html> (last visited 25 Jan. 2019); ECB,
Press Release: ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme, 22 Jan. 2015 <www.
ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html> (last visited 25 Jan. 2019).
16. Decision 2015/774, cited supra note 1, Recital 7.
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onwards.17 Following a further extension until December 2017,18 net
purchases under the APP would be reduced to EUR 15 billion from October to
December 2018, after which they would end (reflecting the return of inflation
rates to close to the 2 % target).19
2.2. Preliminary reference of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
Generally, the Bundesverfassungsgericht performs three different heads of
review in relation to questions of constitutionality connected20 to EU law:
ultra vires review, identity review, and fundamental rights review. For the
purposes of the present analysis, the first two are relevant. Introduced in its
Maastricht decision and confirmed in its review of the Lisbon Treaty, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht defined ultra vires review as the “jurisdiction to
assert the responsibility for integration if obvious transgressions of the
boundaries occur when the European Union claims competences”.21 Beyond
the test itself, there are two further qualifications added in the Honeywell
decision that restrict the applicability of ultra vires review: first, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht is the only German Court allowed to carry out the
review; and second, “the Court of Justice has a right to tolerance of error”.22 In
addition, in its Lisbon decision,23 the Bundesverfassungsgericht added
constitutional identity as another head of review, measured against the
standards set out in the unamendable core of the German Basic Law.
Despite its crucial role in the development of EU law through its indirect
interactions with the Court of Justice,24 the German Court did not engage
17. Decision 2017/100, cited supra note 2, Recital 5.
18. Ibid.
19. ECB, Press Release: Monetary Policy Decisions, 14 June 2018 <www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/pr/date/2018/html/ecb.mp180614.en.html> (last visited 28 Jan. 2019).
20. Early case law reviewed only national acts implementing EU law, whereas later on the
Bundesverfassungsgericht applied the same heads of review in relation to Treaty amendments
pending national ratification, as well as individual European arrest warrants issued pursuant to
the EAW Framework Decision. See German Bundesverfassungsgericht 2 BvR 2735/14 Mr R.
Order of 15 Dec. 2015, <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilun
gen/EN/2016/bvg16-004.html> (last visited 5 Mar. 2019).
21. German Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 2 BVerfG 2/08 LisbonTreaty, Judgment of 30
June 2009, <www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> (last visited 5 Mar. 2019),
para 240.
22. German Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 2 BvR 2661/06 Honeywell, Order of 06 July
2010, <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2010/07/rs201
00706_2bvr266106en.html> (last visited 5 Mar. 2019), para 66.
23. German Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 2 BVerfG 2/08 Lisbon Treaty, supra note 21,
para 240.
24. Vranes, “German constitutional foundations of, and limitations to, EU integration: A
systematic analysis”, 14 GLJ (2013), 75.
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in the preliminary reference procedure until 2014. The
Bundesverfassungsgericht submitted its first preliminary reference to the ECJ
in order to ascertain whether an EU act was ultra vires, doubting the
compatibility of the OMT mechanism with primary EU law, and more
specifically, its provisions on the scope of the ECB’s monetary policy
mandate and the prohibition of monetary budget financing.25
In its reply, the Court of Justice chose to preserve the OMT programme. It
first concluded that indirect effects of monetary policy on economic policy do
not make them equivalent, leading to the conclusion that the ECB was acting
within the boundaries of its mandate,26 and setting out conditions for the
programme’s compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing.27 In its
final decision, theBundesverfassungsgericht accepted the conditions attached
to the OMT programme as defined by the ECJ,28 as well as the standard of
review of Union acts it exercises.29 Should the ECB, in a potential use of the
OMT mechanism, transgress any of these conditions, such an action will be
considered ultra vires.30
It is against this background that the German Court submitted its second
preliminary reference to the ECJ, now questioning the ECB’s PSPP as
described in section 2.1. First, the PSPP is, according to the applicants in the
case, in breach of the prohibition of monetary financing in Article 123 TFEU.
The applicants argue that the specified amounts, timescales, as well as the
allocation key for monthly purchases of securities prevent the formation of a
market price and result in direct purchasing of government bonds.31 Second,
the applicants argued that the ECB exceeded its monetary policy mandate by
enacting the PSPP. Taken together, this results in a breach of German
25. German Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 2 BvR 2728/13 Gauweiler, Judgment of 21
June 2016, <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2016/06/
rs20160621_2bvr272813en.html> (last visited 5 Mar. 2019), paras. 36, 39, 63 and 80. For a
wide array of opinions and analyses of the preliminary reference, see the Special Issue: The
OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 15 GLJ, (2014).
26. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and others v. Deutscher Bundestag, EU:C:2015:400, paras.
52 and 56, relying on its findings in Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756.
27. Ibid., paras. 30–31.
28. BVerfG Gauweiler, supra note 25, para 174. The Bundesverfassungsgericht did
however mention the arguments it found to be important for the review of the OMT programme,
which were not taken into account by the ECJ, and the question submitted in the preliminary
reference on the independence of the ECB that the ECJ did not answer (paras. 181–189).
29. Ibid., para 179. The Bundesverfassungsgerichtmentioned specifically that the standard
of review is now more explicit in relation to the ECB (para 180).
30. Ibid., paras. 193 and 205.
31. German Bundesverfassungsgericht Cases 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR
2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15 Weiss and Others, Order of 18 July 2017, (hereinafter: BVerfGWeiss)
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2017/bvg17-070.html>
(last visited 5 Mar. 2019), paras. 25–31.
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constitutional identity found in the right to vote and the subsequent budgetary
powers of the Bundestag.32
TheBundesverfassungsgericht began its analysis by referring to its case law
concerning ultra vires and identity review, underlining that the right to vote is
based on human dignity and thus forms part of the inviolable core of the
German constitution,33 and reserved for itself the right to review EU acts
against this standard. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, referring to the
standards fromGauweiler, noted that the PSPP (given its volume and effects)
has more than indirect economic policy effects, which, in the absence of
justification, amounts to an excess of the monetary policy mandate of the
ECB.
The reference cites the ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler for the relevant
standard in relation to the possible circumvention of the prohibition of Article
123 TFEU:
“[The] ESCB’s [European System of Central Banks] intervention could,
in practice, have an effect equivalent to that of a direct purchase of
government bonds from public authorities and bodies of the Member
States if the potential purchasers of government bonds on the primary
market knew for certain that the ESCB was going to purchase those bonds
within a certain period and under conditions allowing those market
operators to act, de facto, as intermediaries for the ESCB for the direct
purchase of those bonds from the public authorities and bodies of the
Member State concerned”.34
In Gauweiler, the ECJ found that since the ECB did not carry out any prior
announcements concerning the volume and timescale of purchases, this acts
as a safeguard in relation to a possible breach of Article 123 TFEU.35 The
Bundesverfassungsgericht thus reached a conclusion that it considers these
safeguards binding upon the ECB, as well as the ECJ, when reviewing ECB
action.36 In the view of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the ECB’s position in
the institutional structure of the EU requires a narrow interpretation of its
mandate, given that its decisions are not made through the political process of
deliberation.37 It also agreed with the applicants in determining the influence
that these findings have on the position of the Bundestag:
32. Ibid., para 31.
33. Ibid., para 44.
34. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 104.
35. Ibid., para 106.
36. BVerfG Weiss, cited supra note 31, para 79.
37. Ibid., para 103.
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“It follows from the democratic basis of budget autonomy . . . that the
Bundestag may not consent to an inter-governmentally or supranationally
agreed automatic guarantee or performance which is not subject to strict
requirements and whose effects are not limited, which – once it has been
set in motion – is removed from the Bundestag’s control and influence.
The Bundestag must individually approve every large-scale federal aid
measure on the international or European Union level that is made in
solidarity and results in expenditure”.38
The Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that if the Court of Justice found the
PSPP outside the ECB’s mandate and in breach of the prohibition of monetary
financing, such a transgression would be considered structurally
significant,39 thus meeting the ultra vires standard. Otherwise, should the
German Court consider that the Court of Justice did not abide by its own
conditions fromGauweiler, it will consider its preliminary ruling ultra vires.40
The Bundesverfassungsgericht submitted five questions. The first question
to the ECJ was whether the prohibition on monetary financing was infringed,
given the following factors: communication regarding the purchases creating
de facto certainty in the market; the lack of transparency regarding the
blackout period preventing judicial review; the holding of bonds until
maturity; and the purchase of marketable debt instruments with a negative
yield to maturity.
The second question concerned the infringement of Article 123 TFEU if
changing market conditions (in particular a shortage of eligible bonds)
precipitate a loosening of the purchase rules, and if the restrictions previously
established by the ECJ for a bond purchase programme lose their effect.
The third question concerned the infringement of Articles 119 and 127(1)
and (2) TFEU and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the European System of
Central Banks and the ECB as it exceeds the mandate of the ECB, especially
given that the volume of the PSPP materially influences the refinancing terms
of the Member States; that the effect on refinancing of Member States, as well
as on commercial banks, carries more than an “indirect” economic policy
effect; that, given its economic impact, the PSPP infringes on the principle of
proportionality; and that the absence of a statement of reasons makes it
impossible to examine whether the PSPP is still necessary and proportionate.
Fourth, the Bundesverfassungsgericht asked whether the PSPP
nevertheless infringes these provisions, given the volume of the programme,
38. Ibid., para 56 referring to the German Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 2 BvR 1390/12
European Stability Mechanism, Judgment of 18 Mar. 2014.
39. BVerfG Weiss, cited supra note 31, para 66.
40. Ibid., para 79.
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its implementation for over two years and its economic effects – thus
exceeding the monetary policy mandate of the ECB.
Lastly, the fifth question asked whether Articles 123 and 125 TFEU and
Article 4(2) TEU are infringed, given the unlimited sharing of risks between
the national central banks of the Eurosystem, if the recapitalizing of national
central banks using budget funds might be necessary in the event of
non-repayment of bonds.
3. Opinion of theAdvocate General
Advocate General Wathelet found the preliminary ruling in principle
admissible.41 The fifth question he found to be hypothetical, however, given
the impossibility to ascertain the likelihood of non-repayment of bonds.42 As
for the remaining questions, the Advocate General referred to the Gauweiler
conditions for compliance with Article 123(1) TFEU. First, the purchase of
government bonds on secondary markets is not allowed under conditions
which would be equivalent to that of a direct purchase of government bonds.43
Second, the impetus of the Member States to follow a sound budgetary policy
must not be impaired.44
Advocate General Wathelet found that the PSPP has sufficient safeguards
preventing it from amounting to monetary financing.45 In support of this, he
first pointed to the obligation of the Governing Council to constantly monitor
and adjust the PSPP.46 Second, the volume of government bonds purchased
under the PSPP is dependent on private bonds bought under the other three
sub-programmes.47 Third, unlike the OMT, the PSPP purchases are based on
the ECB’s capital subscription key, leading to greater unpredictability.48
Fourth, the limit on holding certain government securities, and the daily risk
monitoring of these limits, prevents certainty for operators in the primary
market.49 Fifth, a blackout period without a pre-determined duration allows
the formation of a market price.50 Lastly, the information provided by the ECB
regarding the PSPP is necessary for its effectiveness, through the “signalling
41. Opinion of A.G. Wathelet, of 4 Oct. 2018, EU:C:2018:815, paras. 35–36.
42. Ibid., para 45.
43. Opinion, para 50 in reference to Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 97.
44. Opinion, para 50.
45. Ibid., para 54.
46. Ibid., para 55.
47. Ibid., para 56.
48. Ibid., para 57.
49. Ibid., para 58.
50. Ibid., para 59.
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channel,” but is general enough to prevent de facto certainty regarding the
purchase of government bonds.51
On the question of whether there exists de facto certainty concerning which
specific securities will be bought, Advocate General Wathelet found this
insufficient to invalidate the PSPP. First, any potential certainty needs to take
into account that not only government bonds are available for purchase under
the PSPP.52 Second, while this certainty relies on a shortage of securities, the
ECB carried out a “thoughtful and measured assessment”.53
Similarly, the Opinion found that the features of the PSPP do not deter
Member States from following a sound fiscal policy. First, the option to sell
securities or end the programme is at the ESCB’s discretion.54 Second,
securities eligible for purchase under the PSPP require a certain credit quality
rating.55 Third, the PSPP only allows for limited risk sharing.56 Lastly, the
purchases according to the ECB’s capital key prevents virtually assisting
Member States in financial difficulty (as it does not target such States).57
The Advocate General discussed the third and fourth questions, which deal
with the connection between the PSPP and monetary policy, including its
proportionality, together.58 He referred toGauweiler and Pringle, finding that
both the objective of the PSPP (price stability) and the instruments used
(purchasing public sector securities on the secondary market) pertain to
monetary policy.59 Furthermore, the Opinion referred toGauweiler in arguing
that a measure cannot be considered economic policy if it has merely indirect
effects on the economy of Member States.60 In the case of the PSPP, any
improvement to the economic situation of Member States is an indirect effect
of monetary policy, given the guarantees in place preventing the pursuit of a
primary economic policy objective (i.e. the “limited” nature of the
programme).61
Nonetheless, the PSPP needs to be proportionate. Recalling Gauweiler, in
light of the broad discretion of the ESCB, judicial review should be focused on
reviewing procedural guarantees, such as the obligation “to examine carefully
and impartially all the relevant elements of the situation in question and to give
51. Ibid., paras. 61–64.
52. Ibid., para 79.
53. Ibid., para 81.
54. Ibid., para 85.
55. Ibid., para 86.
56. Ibid., paras. 87 and 89.
57. Ibid., para 88.
58. Ibid., para 93.
59. Ibid., paras. 102–107.
60. Ibid., para 98.
61. Ibid., para 123.
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an adequate statement of the reasons for its decisions”.62 In relation to the
ability of the PSPP to maintain price stability, the Advocate General accepted
the ECB’s explanation.63 Given the economic context during which the
Decision had been adopted, where other measures had proven unsuccessful64
and not taking action was problematic,65 the PSPP was necessary.66
In assessing the adequacy of the statement of reasons, the Advocate
General looked into a wide array of sources, such as the introductory
statements of the President of the ECB and the minutes of the ECB Governing
Council’s monetary policy meetings.67 Taken together these constituted
sufficient reasons to preclude a manifest error of assessment.68 Finally, in
assessing proportionality stricto sensu, the Advocate General found that “the
various amendments to the PSPP, in particular in terms of duration and
volume, are therefore the outcome of balancing the interests involved”.69
There were therefore no factors affecting the validity of the PSPP.
4. Judgment of the Court of Justice
The ECJ followed the Advocate General on questions of admissibility,70
finding the fifth question inadmissible due to its hypothetical nature.71 The
Court, considering all the other four questions together, looked at three issues:
whether the ECB complied with the obligation to state reasons; whether the
PSPP falls within the sphere of the ESCB’s powers; and whether it is
compatible with the prohibition of monetary financing of Member States.
First, regarding the duty to state reasons, the Court concurred with the
Advocate General’s broad assessment of which documents are relevant for
making this finding.72 The Court additionally argued that publishing details of
the blackout period would relate to the content of the measure, and not the
reasons justifying it.73 Therefore, the Court found that the ECB complied with
its duty to state reasons.
62. Ibid., para 125 in reference to Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 69.
63. Ibid., para 130.
64. Ibid., para 134.
65. Ibid., para 135.
66. Ibid., paras. 127–131.
67. Ibid., para 133.
68. Ibid., para 138.
69. Ibid., para 148.
70. Judgment, paras. 17–26.
71. Ibid., para 166.
72. Ibid., para 37.
73. Ibid., para 43.
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Second, in determining whether the PSPP falls within the sphere of
monetary policy,74 the Court followed the Advocate General’s reference to
Gauweiler and Pringle, focusing on the objectives and instruments of the
measure in question.75 It found that regardless of any indirect effects on
economic policy, the PSPP cannot be treated as an economic policy
measure.76 As to what constitutes an indirect effect, the Court rejected the
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s interpretation, relying instead on the notion of
indirect effects elaborated in Gauweiler and Pringle: the foreseeable
consequences of those measures, which have therefore been knowingly
accepted at that time.77
Here, the Court differed from the Opinion that it is necessary to assess
whether sufficient guarantees exist to prevent an economic aim from
overshadowing a monetary one. Instead, the Court stated that in the pursuit of
monetary policy, there will always be a foreseeable and accepted impact on the
real economy, and that failing to consider these as indirect effects would
prevent the ESCB from fulfilling its goals.78 Regarding the instruments of the
PSPP, the programme is based on the purchase of government securities on the
secondary market, which falls within Article 18.1 of the Protocol on the
ESCB and the ECB.79 For these reasons, the Court found that the PSPP falls
within the domain of monetary policy.80
In its proportionality analysis, the Court followed Advocate General
Wathelet in measuring the proportionality of the PSPP against its economic
effects.81 As regards suitability, the Court looked at the economic context and
practice of other central banks in order to determine that the ESCB did not
commit a manifest error of assessment.82 Furthermore, as regards necessity,
the Court found that the PSPP does not go manifestly beyond what is
necessary to achieve its objective. In support of this, the Court looked at the
context, features, and scale of the PSPP.
First, the Court accepted the ECB’s explanation that no other type of
monetary policy measure would be able to achieve the same objective.83
Second, the fact that the PSPP is not selective, its strict eligibility criteria, as
74. Ibid., para 45.
75. Ibid., para 53.
76. Ibid., para 61.
77. Ibid., para 63, referring to Case C-370/12, Pringle and Case C-62/14, Gauweiler,
para 52.
78. Ibid., paras. 64–67.
79. Ibid., para 69.
80. Ibid., para 70.
81. Ibid., para 71. See also Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 66.
82. Ibid., para 78.
83. Ibid., para 81.
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well as the temporary nature of the programme, render it necessary.84 The
Court accepted that the efficacy of the PSPP requires a sufficiently large
volume of purchases.85 The Court thus concluded that limiting the volume or
duration of the programme would not be as efficient and rapid.86 Third, the
Court agreed with the Advocate General that the “ESCB weighed up the
various interests involved so as effectively to prevent disadvantages which are
manifestly disproportionate to the PSPP’s objective from arising on
implementation of the programme”.87 In particular, given that such open
market operations entail the risk of losses,88 the ESCB’s adoption of rules
regarding risk-sharing aim to mitigate these risks.89 Thus, the PSPP was
proportionate.
Third, the Court analysed whether the PSPP is in line with the prohibition of
monetary financing. The preliminary reference specifically invited the Court
to apply its judgment inGauweiler at this point.90 The Court, agreeing with the
Advocate General, recalled theGauweiler principle that the intervention must
not have an effect equivalent to the direct purchase of bonds, and the
programme must contain sufficient safeguards not to reduce the impetus for
Member States to pursue a sound budgetary policy.91
On the first point, the Court acknowledged some foreseeability as to the
ESCB’s intervention, given the publication of some of the programme’s
features.92 However, numerous safeguards reduce certainty and maintain its
consistency with Article 123(1) TFEU: the observance of an undisclosed
blackout period; the ESCB only providing certainty regarding volumes of
purchases for the APP as a whole; flexibility in the distribution of purchases;
allowing for the purchase of diversified securities; the provision of purchase
limits; and a lack of full transparency in the disclosure of purchases.93
The Court then turned its attention to whether the impetus for Member
States to conduct a sound budgetary policy is reduced. The Court recognized
that monetary policy will always have an impact on interest rates and bank
refinancing, which impacts the refinancing conditions of public debt.94
However, the programme “may not create certainty regarding a future
84. Ibid., paras. 82–86.
85. Ibid., para 90.
86. Ibid., para 92.
87. Ibid., para 93.
88. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 125.
89. Judgment, paras. 95–99.
90. BVerfG Weiss, cited supra note 31, para 66.
91. Judgment, paras. 104–107.
92. Ibid., paras. 111–112.
93. Ibid., paras. 113–126.
94. Ibid., para 130 referring to Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 110.
CML Rev. 20191016 Case law
purchase of Member State bonds”.95 Here, the Court’s logic mirrors its
findings on other questions: the temporary nature of the programme and the
safeguards in place ensure the impetus to conduct a sound budgetary policy.
The final point the Court addressed was whether holding bonds until
maturity and purchasing bonds at a negative yield to maturity are compatible
with Article 123(1) TFEU. Regarding the holding of bonds until maturity, the
impetus for Member States to conduct a sound monetary policy is not
diminished, as the ESCB retains the option of selling the bond in question,96
and in the event the ESCB holds onto the bond, there is no obligation to make
further purchases from a Member State that ceases to follow a sound
budgetary policy.97 On the issue of bonds at a negative yield, the purchase of
such bonds from the secondary market does not give rise to a direct purchase
or the granting of a credit facility to a Member State.98 The purchase of such
securities diminishes the certainty of operators and does not have an
equivalent effect to a direct purchase of bonds.99 As a consequence, the PSPP
is valid.100
5. Analysis
5.1. Scope of the monetary policy mandate
One central problem of theWeiss judgment concerns the delineation between
monetary and general economic policy. The Treaties leave the division
between the two ambiguous – while Article 3 TFEU lists monetary policy for
Eurozone States as an exclusive Union competence, economic policy is
confusingly cordoned off into a separate “coordinating” category, that is
neither “shared” in the sense of Article 4 TFEU, nor is it an exclusively
national competence. In spite of this, the German Court has no difficulty in
concluding that “it would constitute a manifest and structurally significant
exceeding of competences if the ECB acted outside its monetary mandate”.101
Interpreting the mandate of the ECB in keeping with the German tradition, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht thus attempts to delineate a clear line between
95. Ibid., para 132 referring to Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 113–114.
96. Ibid., para 150.
97. Ibid., para 151.
98. Ibid., para 155.
99. Ibid., para 156.
100. Ibid., para 168(1).
101. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, para 64.
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monetary policy (as an exclusive EU matter) and fiscal policy (as a
prerogative of the Member States subject “to a few exceptions”).102
Such an approach resonates deeply with the traditions of the German
constitutional order. As Schütze points out, German federalism is based on a
tradition of dual federalism in which the German Courts have attempted to
separate and compartmentalize the different fields in which the federal and
State levels may act.103 The PSPP illustrates the profound limits of this
approach when transferred to a supra-national economic and monetary
Union. While monetary policy may seem like a simple exercise in setting and
policing interest rates, the ability of interest-rate setting to achieve the goal of
price stability is entirely mediated through the general economy. The story of
the “post-crisis” developed world, i.e. from 2012 on (and Mario Draghi’s “do
what it takes” speech), has been a story of the increasing redundancy of
conventional monetary policy instruments. The traditional central bank tool –
stimulating spending and lending by lowering interest rates – simply no longer
works when there is no interest rate left to cut. As such, the measures required
to raise inflation to the 2 percent target required instruments promoting more
general economic stimulus.
The ECJ is in this sense surely right in insisting that “the authors of the
Treaties did not intend to make an absolute separation between economic and
monetary policies”.104 The provision of a secondary economic mandate for
the ECB under Article 127(1) TFEU and the setting of shared guiding
principles for both economic and monetary policy under Article 119(3) TFEU
suggest that the Treaty drafters well understood the close inter-dependencies
between these two fields. For the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to
work effectively, it requires a cooperative, rather than exclusive, relationship
between monetary and general economic policies.
The narrower legal question is whether Weiss utilizes the correct doctrinal
tools to articulate the relationship between the two fields. Here, the judgment
again relies on aspects of the Gauweiler decision. Stating that identifying
whether PSPP is an aspect of monetary policy requires engaging with the
objectives of the measure,Weiss followsGauweiler in relying on the notion of
“direct” and “indirect” effects.105 While the PSPP is seen as having
acknowledged effects on the refinancing conditions of the Member States,
these are conceptualized by the Court as “indirect” and therefore not affecting
the programme as a monetary measure.
102. Ibid., para 65.
103. Schütze, “Classifying EU competences: German constitutional lessons?” in Garben
and Govaere (Eds.) TheDivision of Competences Between the EU and theMember States (Hart,
2017).
104. Judgment, para 60.
105. Ibid., para 61; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 52.
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The use of direct/indirect effects carries a certain logic. If tying the
classification of a measure to its objective requires a rather subjective enquiry
into the minds of the creator of a given programme, the notion of “effects” is
more objective, requiring Courts to assess the real-world implications of a
given measure. The difficulty is the classification of the effects of the PSPP as
indirect. As discussed above, the point of secondary asset purchases is to
stimulate the general economy. As explained by Mario Draghi when
announcing the first major expansion of the programme in 2015:
“The sizeable increase in our balance sheet will further ease the monetary
policy stance. In particular, financing conditions for firms and households
in the euro area will continue to improve. Moreover, today’s decisions will
support our forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates and reinforce
the fact that there are significant and increasing differences in the
monetary policy cycle between major advanced economies. Taken
together, these factors should strengthen demand, increase capacity
utilisation and support money and credit growth, and thereby contribute to
a return of inflation rates towards 2%”.106
In this sense, the PSPP contributed to the easing of deflation and meeting the
price stability target precisely through encouraging private spending and
credit growth i.e. through stimulating the general economy. If this is so,
however, why are the PSPP’s economic effects indirect? In fact, the most
direct effects of the programme are precisely its economic effects, with a
general raising of prices (and therefore a meeting of the inflation target)
constituting an indirect consequence of a broader easing of economic
conditions and the general money supply. This is the quandary that the use of
the language of direct/indirect effect places the ECJ in: while the traditional
“centre of gravity test” focuses on a measure’s intent and features,107 there
seems to be a clear divergence between the ordinary meaning of “direct”
effects and their use in Weiss.
5.2. The prohibition of monetary financing
Both the OMT and the PSPP are instruments by virtue of which the ECB is
able to buy government-issued bonds on the secondary market. Following
Gauweiler, however, such purchases would not be allowed under conditions
106. Introductory Statement (22 Jan. 2015). Available at <www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html> (last visited 28 May 2019).
107. See e.g. Case C-338/01, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2004:253; Case C-130/10,
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472.
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of “equivalence” to primary purchases,108 ultimately reducing the impetus for
Member States to follow a sound budgetary policy.109 To address this issue,
the Court stated that when the ECB purchases government bonds on
secondary markets, it must introduce “sufficient safeguards”.110
In Gauweiler, the ECJ set out the necessary safeguards against the
circumvention of Article 123(1) TFEU: (1) a lack of certainty must exist
concerning whether, when, which, and for how long the purchases will be
made;111 (2) the measure must not disincentivize Member States from
following a sound budgetary policy;112 (3) holding purchased bonds until
maturity is allowed as long as the market operators cannot be certain that this
option will be used;113 and (4) the risk to which the ECB is exposed is
mitigated by the condition of compliance with the European Stability
Mechanism financing, attached to potential purchases.114 One of the points in
the preliminary reference was the insistence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
that the ECJ, when reviewing whether the PSPP complies with Article 123(1)
TFEU, does so against these requirements.115 The German Court thus
regarded the conditions from Gauweiler as the relevant standard for Article
123(1) TFEU. Otherwise, the ECJ would itself be acting ultra vires.116
The Court of Justice agreed that Article 123(1) TFEU stands in the way of
any measure that would have an effect equivalent to directly purchasing
government bonds, and it does require safeguards to ensure Member States
follow a sound budgetary policy.117 Yet, it stated that the conditions it attached
to the OMT cannot straightforwardly be applied to all ECB action in the
monetary field, underlining that it is necessary to keep in mind the “particular
features of the programme under consideration and the economic context” in
which it was enacted and implemented.118 This caveat seems to have been
designed not only to decrease the chances that the Bundesverfassungsgericht
108. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 97.
109. Ibid., para 100.
110. Ibid., para 102.
111. Ibid., paras. 103, 104 and 112.
112. Ibid., paras. 116–117.
113. Ibid., para 118.
114. Ibid., paras. 120 and 124. This condition is not straightforwardly applicable to the
PSPP given that, unlike the OMT, it applies not only to Member States receiving financial
assistance, but to all Members of the euro area. However, Art. 3(2) PSPP determines that bonds
that would be ineligible due to the lack of required credit quality can be purchased if the relevant
Member State is in receipt of financial assistance and in compliance with its conditions, thus
partially reflecting the conditionality logic of the OMT. See also, Viterbo, “Legal and
accountability issues arising from the ECB’s conditionality”, 1 EP (2016), 501, at 525–528.
115. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, para 79.
116. Ibid.
117. Judgment, paras. 106–107.
118. Ibid., para 108.
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declares the judgment ultra vires, but to allow the ECJ,119 as well as the ECB
itself, further flexibility in the future.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht wondered whether sufficient certainty
existed on the market to circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing,
given the available communication concerning the purchases120 and the ability
to hold bonds until maturity.121 At the same time, the possibility for the
Governing Council to impose blackout periods on purchases without prior
announcement would, in the view of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, not
influence price formation on the market, but prevent meaningful judicial
review.122 Conversely, the Court of Justice used precisely the blackout period
to support the conclusion that private market operators would not be able to
act as de facto intermediaries of Member States.123 The ECJ further concluded
that information such as the general volume of purchases124 and their
distribution according to the ECB capital contribution key,125 only provide
aggregate information126 subject to revision and update by the ECB,127 who is
thus free to amend the purchases so as to meet the requirements of Article
123(1) TFEU. From the perspective of judicial review, the necessary
consequence is more leeway for the ECB to determine the manner of securing
compliance with Article 123(1) TFEU.
There is in this sense a difference between the two courts, relating to the
difference between formal and substantive reasoning. The ECJ’s reasoning on
this point is decidedly formal. What matters in its view is that particular
safeguards have been put in place by the ECB to limit the foreseeability of
asset purchases.128 What matters is that the risk of “equivalence” has been
identified, and appropriate formal safeguards put in place (an approach also
followed by A.G. Wathelet). The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning is
much more substantive. What matters is not that there are safeguards per se,
119. de Búrca argues that EU law has more generally evolved through the use of vague and
open terms that have deliberately been used to “mediate between very different understandings
and conceptions of the issue under discussion.” See de Búrca, “Reappraising subsidiarity’s
significance after Amsterdam”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/99, 1999, 8. See
also, Weatherill, Law and Values in the European Union (OUP, 2016), p. 69.
120. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, paras. 82 and 86.
121. Ibid., para 98.
122. Ibid., para 95.
123. Judgment, paras. 114–117.
124. Ibid., para 118.
125. Ibid., para 120.
126. Ibid., para 126.
127. For example, ibid., paras. 116, 118, 119 and 120.
128. Judgment, paras. 113–124.
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but how effective they are and how they are likely to operate de facto on the
market. The German Court itself attempts to calculate the likely German share
of public securities purchased under the programme and surveys current
market conditions (pointing out that many public securities currently carry a
negative yield below the deposit facility rate, thus rendering them ineligible
for the programme and further narrowing the range of securities available for
the ECB to buy).129 The Bundesverfassungsgericht is simply much more
demanding: it is not willing to take safeguards at their word but is interested in
their effects. These effects are likely to change significantly over time: at the
time of writing, for example, the observations on negative yields, under
different economic conditions, no longer hold (giving some credence to the
ECJ’s more cautious, rules-based approach).
Finally, the Bundesverfassungsgericht questioned whether changing
market conditions may lead to loosening the conditions for compliance with
Article 123(1) TFEU. The ECJ did not directly answer this question, but its
statement concerning the need to take into account the economic context130
implies that any future review will depend greatly on the economic situation,
possibly warranting varying standards of review.
What all these findings share is that the greater the freedom accorded to the
ECB in detailing the implementation of the PSPP, the lesser the ECJ seems
willing to intrude by way of judicial review.131 Given that it is precisely this
concern that was specifically voiced in the preliminary reference, with
consequences for judicial review of EU action more generally, it is not
inconceivable for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to side with the ECJ on more
technical issues, while disagreeing on matters of principle that will shape
judicial review of EU action in the long term.132
5.3. Proportionality as the duty to state reasons
A further issue that is important for the future of EU judicial review is the
judgment’s proportionality analysis. A common criticism of the Gauweiler
129. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, para 85.
130. Judgment, para 108.
131. See, for the same argument, Dawson, Maricut-Akbik and Bobic´, “Reconciling
independence and accountability at the European Central Bank: The false promise of
proceduralism”, 25 ELJ (2019), 75.
132. The same took place in the Gauweiler litigation, where the ECJ avoided addressing
claims of the Bundesverfassungsgericht concerning constitutional identity, but focused
exclusively on the OMT programme. The Bundesverfassungsgericht in turn reiterated its
claims concerning identity and ultra vires review of EU action in the abstract, and accepted the
remaining analysis of the ECJ concerning the OMT programme itself.
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judgment was its limited proportionality review.133 Gauweiler provided the
ECB with broad discretion to gauge the necessity and suitability of the OMT
to meet the ECB’s price stability objectives, subject to the requirement of a
careful and impartial assessment of the relevant facts. This requirement was
seen by the ECJ largely in terms of the duty to state reasons – as the OMT
programme was subjected to observable limits and was directed at serious
concerns regarding the “singleness” of monetary policy, the proportionality
test was satisfied.134
In contrast to this approach, first, a more substantive notion of
accountability would require justifying an action within constitutionally
acceptable terms; second, it would entail a requirement to modify
ill-conceived policies; and third, it assumes the possibility to make amends for
errors of judgement rather than of process.135 Placed in the context of the
ECB, this would entail the Court of Justice being able to require the ECB to
modify an ill-conceived policy and make amends for errors of judgement,
assessed against constitutionally acceptable terms found in the Treaties,
outlining the mandate and powers of the ECB.136 Translated to the context of
theGauweiler judgment, that case demonstrates little substantive engagement
with the proportionality of the OMT: the judgment did not, for example, use
external evidence to verify ECB’s empirical claims regarding the monetary
transmission mechanism, nor did it require the ECB to justify the exclusion of
alternative programmes (with, for example, a lesser impact on national policy
competences).
Substantive review would also entail a more thorough appraisal of the
information-gathering process that forms the basis for the decision in
question. In its review of Commission action, with comparable levels of
technical knowledge and discretion, the ECJ often engages more intensely
with the information provided, examining whether it formed a sound and
consistent basis for the final act.137 In competition law, the Court frequently
demands objective evidence demonstrating the exclusionary effect of an
anticompetitive practice in order to determine a violation under Article 102
133. See e.g. Tridimas and Xanthoulis, “A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case: Between
monetary policy and constitutional conflict”, 23 MJ (2016), 17, at 31; Steinbach, “All’s well
that ends well? Crisis policy after the German constitutional court’s ruling in Gauweiler” 24
MJ (2017), 140, at 145.
134. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 85–92.
135. Oliver, Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for Accountability,
Effectiveness and Citizenship (Open University Press, 1991), p. 28.
136. See Dawson, Maricut-Akbik and Bobic´, op. cit. supra note 131, pp. 76–77.
137. Joined Cases C-92 & 93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke, EU:C:2010:662, para 81.
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TFEU.138 Outside this field, the ECJ has found, for example, the lack of an
impact assessment, despite its unclear legal nature,139 to be a basis for
annulment of a Council regulation.140 Scott and Sturm add that judicial
interpretation can focus on the quality of information gathering and the
peer-review process used to justify EU action and policies. In turn, this
jurisprudence can influence the future design of policymaking by
emphasizing the importance of inclusive, deliberative, and participatory
decisions.141
The PSPP carried several advantages in this regard – after it was activated it
carried a number of supporting analyses explaining the rationale of the
programme as it was amended. The stark differences between the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the ECJ over the implications of this for the
standard of proportionality review, however, remained visible. The German
Court maintained its restrictive view of the conditions under which the
Bundesbank may participate in ECB activities, questioning the PSPP’s
general economic impact and demanding that this should have been weighed
by the ECB.142
Conversely, the central terminology and judicial techniques that defined the
ECJ’s standard of review for the ECB inGauweiler – the notions, for example,
of “broad discretion,” of the need to make “complex technical assessments”
and the focus on whether merely a “manifest error of assessment” has been
made – were repeated in Weiss. The ECJ had even less trouble establishing
proportionality, arguing that the ECB had adopted the programme “in the
context of an economic crisis entailing a risk of deflation”143 and that, in this
context, there was sufficient credibility to the economic analysis produced by
the ECB against any conclusion that the programme is “vitiated by a manifest
error of assessment”.144
As in Gauweiler, the Court of Justice thus avoided that element of the
necessity test that involves considering less burdensome alternatives,145
pointing to the temporary and limited nature of each period of the
programme.146 The Court took information provided by the ECB concerning
138. Ibáñez Colomo, “Beyond the more economics based approach: A legal perspective on
Article 102 TFEU case law”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 3.
139. Alemanno, “A meeting of minds on impact assessment when ex ante evaluation meets
ex post judicial control”, 17 EPL (2011), 485, at 486.
140. Case C-310/04, Spain v. Council, EU:C:2006:521, paras. 121–134.
141. Scott and Sturm, “Courts as catalysts: Re-thinking the judicial role in new
governance”, 13 CJEL (2006), 565, at 573–574.
142. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, para 85.
143. Judgment, para 74.
144. Ibid., para 78.
145. Ibid., para 81.
146. Ibid., paras. 85–86.
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interest rates at face value, without engaging in a genuine analysis of
alternative measures. This is even more visible in the Opinion of the Advocate
General, who not only praised the information provided by the ECB as
“useful,” “clear,” “coherent,” “comprehensive” and part of a “real debate” and
an “open and reasoned discussion”,147 but also accepted the “wait and see
approach”148 as the only alternative offered in the ECB’s assessment, resulting
in the PSPP being a necessary measure.149 The ECB’s justification of the
volume and maturity of securities is thus made subject to an identical formula
as inGauweiler, namely that “nothing more can be required of the ESCB apart
from that it use its economic expertise and the necessary technical means at its
disposal to carry out that analysis with all care and accuracy.”150
In proportionality terms, therefore, there seems to be little meaningful
difference between the two judgments in the standard of scrutiny demanded by
the Court. “Complexity” is again used as a reason for a more limited
proportionality analysis. One conclusion for judicial review of ECB action is
thus that proportionality review – in the monetary field – is restricted to the
review of the duty to state reasons, which only a manifest error of assessment
is able to vitiate. Once this obligation is met, the ECB will face few, if any,
further proportionality restrictions.
It remains to be seen whether reviewing only this duty can still prove a
meaningful way of ensuring the ECB’s legal accountability. There remain
meaningful contrasts with current judicial review of other areas, both of EU
law more broadly and of ECB activity, e.g. via the recently established single
supervisory mechanism (SSM). In terms of broader EU law, as recognized by
Advocates General, EU Courts must be wary in using the “complexity” of a
given policy field as a blanket reason to limit the availability of judicial
review.151 The majority of cases before the EU Courts, dealing with
competition and internal market matters, touch upon complex issues in which
economic forces and unpredictable causal relations are at play.
While the EU Courts have thus insisted that, in areas of complex assessment
and forecasting, EU actors carry a “broad discretion,” this discretion remains
subject to a duty of care.152 While there remain variances in the case law
147. Opinion, paras. 133–134 and 136–137.
148. Ibid., para 135.
149. Ibid., para 137.
150. Judgment, para 91. In comparison, A.G. Wathelet did address necessity, but solely
regarding the alternative measure of inaction, as one that would not be able to achieve the
pursued aim. Opinion, paras. 134–135.
151. See e.g. Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München,
EU:C:1991:317.
152. Mendes, “Discretion, care and public interests in the EU administration: Probing the
limits of law”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 419; Hoffmann, “Delegation, discretion and the duty of
Case C-493/17 1025
elaborating this principle, it involves a duty on the institution to analyse the
relevant facts and information necessary to render a decision, and (in the
words of the Tetra Laval judgment), “to ensure that evidence relied on is
factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence
contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to
assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the
conclusions drawn from it”.153 This wider obligation to scrutinize the manner
in which evidence has been gathered and to ensure a basic pluralism in the
gathering of relevant evidence is displaced in Weiss by a narrower duty (“to
carry out analysis with all care and accuracy”). This lighter duty does not
seem, for example, to require the ECB to have considered other mechanisms
to tackle deflation or to have relied on external evidence of the relation
between asset purchases and prices.
A useful comparison may be with judicial review of other areas of ECB
activity. In the case of the ECB’s supervisory arm, the SSM, the Court has
been both far more willing to annul ECB decisions and more exacting in its
demands.154 The contrasting levels of success for litigants in the monetary and
supervisory arms illustrate this trend well: all four cases concerning monetary
policy were decided in favour of the ECB,155 while in the supervisory arm,
cases were decided against, or partially against, the ECB six out of twelve
times156 (given the nature of SSM decisions directly affecting large financial
institutions, the rates of litigation differ significantly between the two arms).
care in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union”, University of Luxembourg
Law Working Paper Series 4, 2018.
153. Case C-12/03 P, Tetra Laval, EU:C:2005:87, para 39.
154. The literature in this field predominantly argues for a distinction between standards of
review in the monetary and supervisory arms, respectively. This stems from the difference in
the legal framework of the 2 areas, and the extent of discretion awarded to the ECB. See e.g. the
dominant approach in the papers submitted to the ECB Legal Conference: Shaping a new legal
order for Europe: a tale of crises and opportunities, 4–5 Sept. 2017, Frankfurt, available at
<www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecblegalconferenceproceedings201712.en.pdf> (last
visited 28 May 2019).
155. Judgment; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler; Case T-79/13, Accorinti and Others v. ECB,
EU:T:2015:756; Case T-749/15, Nausicaa Anadyomène and Banque d’escompte v. ECB,
EU:T:2017:21.
156. 6 cases decided against or partially against the ECB: Case T-768/16, BNP Paribas v.
ECB, EU:T:2018:471; Case T-745/16, BPCE v. ECB, EU:T:2018:476; Case T-751/16,
Confédération nationale du Crédit mutual v. ECB, EU:T:2018:475; Case T-758/16, Crédit
Agricole v. ECB, EU:T:2018:472; Case T-733/16, Banque postale v. ECB, EU:T:2018:477;
Case T-757/16, Société Générale v. ECB, EU:T:2018:473. 6 cases decided in favour of the
ECB: Case T-52/16, Crédit mutual Arkéa v. ECB, EU:T:2017:902; Case T-712/15, Crédit
mutual Arkéa v. ECB, EU:T:2017:900; T-122/15, Landeskreditbank Baden Württemberg v.
ECB, EU:T:2017:337; Case C-219/17, Berlusconi and Fininvest, EU:C:2018:1023; Case
C-52/17, VTB Bank (Austria), EU:C:2018:648; Joined Cases T-133-136/16, Caisse régionale
de credit agricole mutual Alpes Provence v. ECB, EU:T:2018:219.
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Much of the explanation for these differences emerges from the different
legal frameworks and the implications the EU Courts draw regarding the
appropriate standard of review. While in monetary policy, the Bank carries a
rather broad mandate (which it has itself specified via a 2% inflation target), in
supervision, the EU legislature has established an extensive set of rules
regulating the relationship between the ECB, financial institutions and
national authorities.157 This has allowed the EU Courts to adopt a more
restrictive approach in some cases.
This can be observed, for example, in the six cases decided in 2018, brought
by French banks objecting to the ECB’s refusal to exclude certain saving
products from the capital individual banks were required to transfer to a
French public financial institution.158 The General Court objected in
particular to the ECB’s failure to objectively evidence an identified risk (the
default of the French State), holding that it did not act as a “good
administrator” by failing to conduct a detailed examination of the specific
characteristics of the savings products in question.159
In this sense, when proportionality is invoked as a ground for review in the
monetary arm, it tends to be exhausted by a duty to state reasons,160 whereas
judicial review of the SSM indicates a willingness to go beyond this. The
elaborated rules of the SSM, and the practice of the ECB and the national
authorities it directs, have allowed successful annulment challenges, under
proportionality standards that require the ECB to act as a coherent and
competent administrator.161 By contrast, the monetary field simply lacks such
rules, and with it, the standards available to EU Courts with which to measure
ECB action and subsequently contain ECB discretion. The ECB, given the
different surrounding legal frameworks, is thus conceptualized not as an
“administrator” but as an EU institution “acting independently” to realize
Treaty goals.
The necessity stage, while present in some cases in both the SSM162 and the
monetary field,163 remains highly limited, with the ECJ often refusing to
157. On the different standards of review in these two “arms”, see Lehmann, “Varying
standards of judicial scrutiny over Central Bank actions”, ECB Legal Conference 2017, cited
supra note 154.
158. Case T-733/16,Banque postale,Case T-745/16,BPCE , Case T-751/16,Confédération
nationale du Crédit mutual, Case T-757/16, Société Générale, Case T-758/16, Crédit Agricole,
Case T-768/16, BNP Paribas.
159. For an analysis of the cases, see the note of Rene Smits, available at: <ebi-euro
pa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Summaries-RS.pdf> (last visited 28 May 2019).
160. Judgment; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler.
161. Case T-768/16, BNP Paribas; Case T-745/16, BPCE; Case T-751/16, Confédération
nationale du Crédit mutual; Case T-757/16, Société Générale.
162. Case T-52/16, Crédit mutuel Arkéa; Case T-712/15, Crédit mutual Arkéa.
163. Judgment; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler.
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engage in an actual analysis of different measures beyond those put forward by
the ECB. Finally, “substantive” proportionality review, as detailed in the
beginning of this section, has not yet taken place as the ECJ has not engaged
in an external peer review of the reasons forwarded by the ECB in its decision
making.
The limited number of cases does put a strain on reaching more general
conclusions on judicial review of ECB action, but they do display visible
diverging trends in the two policy areas. The weight of existing case law
suggests a slowly differing dual regime of review of ECB action: a highly
deferential approach to the review of monetary policy on the one hand, and a
level of review in the supervisory arm gradually following the broader pattern
of EU administrative law, on the other.
5.4. Constitutional position of the ECB and consequences for judicial
review
5.4.1. Independence
Weiss, much like in Gauweiler, goes to the heart of a central question for EU
law – what is the role of the EU’s legal and political system in supervising
independent institutions? The ECB’s independence has a different quality,
both in comparison to other notionally independent bodies in the EU system
(like agencies) and to national central banks. Its independence is anchored in
the Treaties, in Articles 130 and 282(3) TFEU. This has been accompanied by
a number of other independence guarantees (e.g. regarding the ECB’s
finances and personnel).164
At the same time, independence (at least in the political economy literature
that has been so influential in developing the model of an independent central
bank) is conceived as independence from political rather than legal
interference.165 Independence is granted not to allow central banks to escape
constitutional supervision per se, but rather to allow them to develop credible
long-term policies without political manipulation. The ECJ once recognized
this by arguing in its OLAF judgment that the ECB’s independence was
largely operational, i.e. restricted to the degree of autonomy necessary for the
164. See on these, Zilioli and Riso, “New tasks and Central Bank independence: The
Eurosystem experience” in Conti-Brown and Lastra (Eds.) Research Handbook on Central
Banking (Edward Elgar, 2018).
165. See e.g. Majone, “Two logics of delegation: Agency and fiduciary relations in EU
governance”, 2European Union Politics (2001), 1; Elgie, “The politics of the European Central
Bank: Principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit”, 9 Journal of European Public Policy
(2002), 186.
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ECB to fulfil its tasks.166 As such, the ECB is caught by the general scheme of
review of the Treaties, and Article 263 TFEU.
The disagreement between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the ECJ can
to a large extent be seen as a disagreement on how that independence should
be interpreted. For the German Court, the nature of the ECB as a
non-majoritarian body makes it an exception to the democratic principle and
to the right of the German people to self-determination.167 As a result, its
mandate, and the extent to which its policies can restrict the prerogatives of
other directly legitimated bodies, must be interpreted strictly.168 For the ECJ,
the rationale is the other way around: the unique anchoring of the ECB’s
independence within the Treaty, and the need to respect its operational
functions as demanded by the principle of institutional balance, suggests
broad discretion for the ECB to determine the range of instruments available
to it to pursue its objectives.169 The “special” nature of the ECB warrants a
looser rather than tighter degree of judicial supervision.
This disagreement frames an inability of either Court to engage
substantively with the surrounding constitutional rationale of the other body.
For theBundesverfassungsgericht, this is reflected in its failure to engage with
the EU’s diverse institutional system and the balance of authority between
institutions that the Treaty provides.170 While many areas of EU action are
governed by detailed rules, the Treaty drafters explicitly provided the ECB
with a general mandate to ensure price stability while leaving the ECB
considerable leeway as to the means necessary to meet that objective. As
argued in a note on the German Court’s preliminary reference, the general
nature of this mandate may warrant a more dynamic interpretation of the
ECB’s mandate, allowing the ECB to respond to new monetary challenges as
they arise (in the context of an EMU that still lacks a strong fiscal pillar).171
The complex weighing of interests and risks associated with conducting
monetary policy places significant hurdles in the way of objective judicial
scrutiny of the substantive reasons underlying ECB decisions. The German
Court’s certainty surrounding the PSPP’s design and effects thus conflicts
166. Case C-11/00, Commission v. European Central Bank (OLAF), EU:C:2003:395,
para 127.
167. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, para 103. BVerfG Gauweiler, cited supra note 25,
para 187 onwards.
168. Ibid. “The endorsement under constitutional law of the ECB’s independence hinges
on the requirement that its mandate be interpreted restrictively”.
169. Judgment, paras. 49–52.
170. Goldmann, “Adjudicating economics? Central bank independence and the appropriate
standard of judicial review”, 15 GLJ (2014), 2.
171. Lang, “Ultra vires review of the ECB’s policy of quantitative easing:An analysis of the
German constitutional court’s preliminary reference order in the PSPP case”, 55 CML Rev.
(2018), 923, at 939–941.
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with the institutional modesty the Treaties demand regarding review of ECB
action.172 The danger here is of the judicial whims of one court (a national
court reflecting that State’s distinct preferences and experience) displacing
the judgement of an institution explicitly designed to render economic
judgements.
For the Court of Justice, this is reflected in the lack of consideration of the
general accountability system in which the ECB sits (and its implications for
national constitutional democracy).173 This includes highly limited
accountability either to national democratic institutions or to national
representatives within EU bodies.174 To provide an example, one aspect of the
ECJ’s limited standard of review is the standard formula on discretion
imported from general EU administrative law that when specialized bodies
make complex assessments of a technical nature, they should be allowed
broad discretion, subject to the duty of the courts to check for a “manifest error
of assessment”.175 This standard was used in Gauweiler176 and Weiss.177
There is, however, a meaningful difference in the degree of political
accountability to which actors like the Commission and the ECB are subject.
For the Commission, its wide discretion is ultimately subject to political
limits. A Commission that makes frequent errors, that exceeds powers
provided for in legislation, or that mismanages policy responsibilities is
ultimately subject to political censure (the revocation, for example, of
delegated powers by the Union’s legislative bodies, or the extensive scrutiny
of the European Parliament).178 The ECB carries no such threat: its main
political accountability mechanism in this field, the Monetary Dialogue, has
frequently been criticized as ineffective (and the ECB has often resisted efforts
to engage in accountability exercises before national parliaments).179 Any
172. In that sense, see the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff in BVerfG
Gauweiler, cited supra note 25, paras. 1 and 5–10.
173. And a departure from its more strict approach taken in Case C-11/00, OLAF.
174. The main political accountability channel in this regard, the Monetary Dialogue, is an
accountability channel to the European Parliament. Accountability channels to the Eurogroup
or National Parliaments are limited and underused. See Dawson, Maricut-Akbik and Bobic´, op.
cit. supra note 131; Tesche, “Instrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit: The ECB’s
unconventional accountability measures during the eurozone crisis”, Journal Eur. Int. (2018),
early view.
175. Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, para 14.
176. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 68.
177. Judgment, para 56.
178. See Brandsma and Blom-Hansen, “Controlling delegated powers in the post-Lisbon
European Union”, 23 Journal of European Public Policy (2016), 531.
179. Amtenbrink and Van Duin, “The European Central Bank before the European
Parliament: Theory and practice after 10 years of monetary dialogue”, 34 EL Rev. (2009), 561;
Collignon and Diessner, “The ECB’s monetary dialogue with the European Parliament:
Efficiency and accountability during the euro crisis?”, 54 JCMS (2016), 1296; Fromage and
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“revocation of authority” could take place only via altering the Treaties
themselves. While in this sense, a limited standard of review in broader
administrative law takes place “in the shadow” of a wider system of political
and administrative control (including to national representatives), the ECB
experiences no such shadow.
5.4.2. Turn to procedural review
The ECB’s independence and the complexity of its tasks suggest a weak
standard of review; at the same time, its lack of political accountability and its
gradual accumulation of significant decision-making power suggest exactly
the opposite. As a consequence, when reviewing monetary decisions, judges
are forced to either limit their review to procedural questions (thus respecting
the former side of the equation) or engage in a more substantive form of
review (respecting the latter side, but involving the Court in complex
economic assessments).
The decision in Weiss indicates a clear preference for the former path: what
the President of the Court has termed as “process-oriented review”.180 This
process-oriented approach couples a high degree of deference to the ECB on
the use of its operational discretion with the notion that reviewing the
procedural steps leading up to the adoption of a decision “is of fundamental
importance.”181 Weiss thus deals with the challenge of complexity by
replacing substantive review with close attention to the procedure and
justifications offered by the ECB in developing the PSPP. First, the ECJ notes
that the ECB provides explanations not only for its initial decision to establish
PSPP, but for subsequent expansion and amendment.182 Second, it notes that
each decision was underpinned by economic analysis, including comparative
analysis (e.g. the use of asset purchase programmes to tackle deflationary
risks by other central banks).183 Third, the ECJ (following the Opinion of A.G.
Wathelet184) takes wider institutional practice and the trend for the ECB to
adopt new transparency exercises, such as press releases, press conferences,
and abridged minutes of meetings of the Governing Council, into account.185
Ibrido, “The ‘Banking Dialogue’ as a model to improve parliamentary involvement in the
monetary dialogue?”, 40 Journal Eur. Int. (2018), 295; Tesche, op. cit. supra note 174.
180. Lenaerts, “The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review”, 31 YEL
(2012), 3; Harvey, “Towards process-oriented proportionality review in the European Union”,
23 EPL (2017), 93.
181. Judgment, para 30.
182. Ibid., para 35.
183. Ibid., para 77.
184. Opinion, paras. 133–138.
185. Judgment, para 37.
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There is considerable merit to the procedural approach. It could be seen as
a means of dealing with a broader tension between a substantive form of
proportionality and a purely deferential form (which carries the danger of
completely absolving the EU Courts of their responsibility to objectively
assess the legality of EU acts). In the wider literature, procedural review has
thus been seen as carrying two advantages, which also pertain in the Weiss
decision. It allows the ECJ, as a judicial institution, to respect the principle of
institutional balance in circumstances where complex measures are under
review.186 At the same time, procedural interrogation can be seen as an
exercise in rationalizing the policy process, with judicial decisions nudging
transnational actors towards increasing the levels of transparency, pluralism
and justification provided via their decision-making.187
This use of procedural devices is, however, questionable, both in general
and specifically when applied to the PSPP case. In more general terms,
broader critiques of process review have focused on the difficulties of
separating process and substance, with the result that process review can hide
substantive disagreements that should either be openly weighed by courts or
dealt with via the political process.188 More specifically, there is evidence to
suggest that some of the procedural mechanisms the ECJ has relied on in
assessing whether acts meet the proportionality test (e.g. the increasing use of
impact assessment in the legislative process) may not always have a robust
basis, either in carrying particular biases (e.g. towards de-regulation) or in
failing to consider seriously arguments of relevance to assessing the
proportionality of a given legal act (e.g. its fundamental rights implications or
the feasibility of less onerous alternatives).189 Some scholars therefore
highlight the dangers of the Court’s procedural turn.
“In this regard, it would appear that the level of justificatory evidence the
Court deems must be adduced by the law-maker in order to satisfy
proportionality review is rather low. To date, the jurisprudence suggests
that absent evidence being lacking entirely (e.g. Spain v. Council) all
evidence adduced by the law-maker will be accepted at face-value, thus
186. Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 180, at 15; Dyzenhaus, “Process and substance as aspects
of the public law form”, 74 CLJ (2015), 284.
187. See Dawson, Maricut-Akbik and Bobic´, op. cit. supra note 131; Scott and Sturm, op.
cit. supra note 141; Popelier, “Preliminary comments on the role of courts as regulatory
watchdogs”, 6 Legisprudence (2012), 257;Alemanno, op. cit. supra note 139, at 485.
188. See e.g. Tushnet, “Darkness on the edge of town: The contribution of John Hart Ely to
constitutional theory”, 89Yale Law Journal (1979); Michelman, “Family Quarrel” in Rosenfeld
and Arato (Eds.) Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (University of
California Press, 1998).
189. Dawson, “Better regulation and the future of EU regulatory law and politics”, 53 CML
Rev. (2016), 1220; Harvey, op. cit. supra note 180, at 119.
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leading to the suspicion that scrutiny of contested measures is effectively
being operated in a box-ticking fashion”.190
In this sense, procedural review can only act as a meaningful substitute for
more substantive forms of review if it involves assessing the adequacy of
procedures themselves.
It is not difficult to apply this critique of procedural review to the Weiss
judgment. While representatives of the Bundesbank were heard in the
proceedings, the evidence relied upon by the ECJ in assessing the
proportionality of the PSPP as well as other aspects (e.g. its link to Art. 123(1)
TFEU) is provided exclusively by the ECB. The only independent source of
information relied upon is the Court’s verification that indeed interest rates
during the time of the PSPP’s programme activation were considerably below
the Bank’s 2 percent target.191
At the same time, assessing the rigour and pluralism of the ECB’s
decision-making practice is difficult – while, for example, the Opinion relies
extensively on the minutes of the Governing Council, these minutes are
redacted and anonymized, making it de facto difficult to assess the extent to
which a meaningful and pluralistic discussion on particular questions has
taken place. Although the ECB produces numerous economic assessments,192
it has not yet established something akin to the Commission’s
impact-assessment process, i.e. a pre-programme mechanism designed to
assess the distributive impact, proportionality, or fundamental rights
implications of its decisions. In simple terms, if an impact assessment is itself
of variable adequacy in grounding the proportionality of decisions, the ECB’s
decision-making may not reach the level of care, pluralism, and transparency
even of this process.
In this context, and without being able to verify the adequacy of procedures
or the veracity and robustness of information adduced by the ECB, procedural
proportionality can easily become the very thing it is meant to avoid: a form
of deference that does little to re-assure critics of the ECB that its policies have
been rigorously judicially reviewed (while also doing little to encourage the
ECB to engage in more rigorous decision-making).
190. Harvey, op. cit. supra note 180, at 118. See also, Weatherill, “The limits of legislative
harmonization ten years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s case law has become a
‘drafting guide’”, 12 GLJ (2011), 827.
191. Judgment, para 75.
192. See e.g. the Economic Bulletin series: <www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bull
etin/html/eb201804.en.html> (last visited 28 May 2019).
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5.4.3. Transparency
As discussed in section 5.3 above, in cases where the ECJ reviews the exercise
of broad discretion by EU bodies, the duty to state reasons takes on a special
significance. It is within the duty to state reasons that EU law connects with
the broader accountability structure of EU governance.193 This duty is a basic
requirement of ensuring that the exercise of public authority carries a rational
basis that is knowable both to the general public and to the specific addressees
of EU acts. This general duty combines, in the specific case of the PSPP, with
certain transparency obligations written into its founding acts (e.g. the
publication of details regarding the value of securities held under the PSPP, the
weight of securities between issuers, and eligibility criteria on assets eligible
for purchase).194 These elements are relied upon by the Court to motivate its
finding that the ECB’s duty to state reasons justifying the establishment of the
PSPP was fulfilled.195
These transparency obligations fit within a more general narrative
surrounding the relationship between the ECB’s accountability and its
independence: the two elements have often been said by the ECB to be “two
sides of the same coin”.196 A more transparent ECB can better instil
confidence in its activities, thus safeguarding its legitimacy and wider
independence. Similarly, an independent ECB has less to fear from political
interference, allowing it to make its decision-making process more open
without fear of political sanction ex post.197
Weiss shows the limits of this vision. What if transparency, under particular
circumstances, not only damages the ability of the ECB to fulfil its functions
but impinges upon constitutional obligations the ECB is required to uphold
under the terms of the Treaty? This is precisely the dilemma that the PSPP
presents. If PSPP were truly transparent, i.e. if market participants could know
and anticipate the exact securities the ECB were likely to buy under the
programme, and in which quantities, a key “red line” set out in Gauweiler
would be crossed. This red line is that, just as Article 123(1) TFEU prohibits
193. See Mashaw, “Reasoned administration: The European Union, the United States and
the project of democratic governance”, 76 George Washington Law Review (2007), 99.
194. Decision 2015/774, cited supra note 1, Art. 3.
195. Judgment, paras. 29–44.
196. Cœuré, “Independence and Accountability in a Changing World” (Introductory
Remarks, Brussels (28 Mar. 17). Available at: <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/
html/sp170328_1.en.html> (last visited 28 May 2019).
197. See e.g. Curtin, “‘Accountable independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing
the logics of transparency”, 23 ELJ (2017), 28; Gandrud, Hallerberg and Véron, “The European
Union remains a laggard on banking supervisory transparency” Bruegel (May 2016); Braun,
Two Sides of the Same Coin? Independence and Accountability at the ECB (Transparency
International EU, 2017).
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the direct purchase of government bonds by the ECB, so it also prohibits
purchases on the secondary market whose contours are so foreseeable as to
make them equivalent to primary purchases.198 Such equivalence, by
providing market participants the security that particular bonds would be
purchased by the ECB in any case, would likely distort the formation of a true
market price, and in doing so, reduce the incentives for Member States to
follow a sound budgetary policy.199 This is the silver thread connectingWeiss
to Pringle – once Article 123 TFEU had been interpreted in terms of the
broader objective of budgetary responsibility, a trap had been set for any ECB
programme likely to relieve the fiscal strain felt by government servicing debt
via public securities.
It is therefore with some justification that the Bundesverfassungsgericht
continually points to the tension between the transparency obligations
undertaken in the context of Decision 2015/774 and Article 123(1) TFEU.200
The programme may in fact be too transparent if one takes market realities into
account. As the German Court points out, the strict eligibility criteria of the
programme, and its tie to a national distribution key, means that, in practice,
the number of securities available to the ECB for purchase on secondary
markets for certain States may be decidedly limited.201 Weiss thus puts the
idea of a mutually re-enforcing link between transparency and independence
to the test: the nature of its monetary policy forces the ECB, and the judiciary,
to police an awkward trade-off between these two values.
This point also applies in terms of the tension between Article 123(1)TFEU
and the adoption by PSPP of a “blackout period”. Precisely to allow
Gauweiler’s red line on the outer limits of Article 123(1) TFEU to be met, the
details of a “blackout period” between the issuance of a security by a public
authority and its purchase on the secondary market remain non-transparent.202
With some bravado, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, having already
complained about the implications of transparency for Article 123(1) TFEU,
in addition argued that the lack of information on the duration of the blackout
period potentially violates the duty to state reasons, by restricting the ability of
EU Courts to verify the period’s adequacy.203
While the Bundersverfassungsgericht’s question in this regard appears
contradictory, this may simply reflect divergences between the two courts on
198. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 97.
199. Ibid., paras. 100–102.
200. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, paras. 85–90.
201. Ibid., para 90. See also, Goldmann, “Summer of Love: Karlsruhe refers the QE case to
Luxembourg”, Verfassungsblog (16 Aug. 2017), available at <verfassungsblog.de/summer-
of-love-karlsruhe-refers-the-qe-case-to-luxembourg/> (last visited 5 Mar. 2019).
202. Decision 2015/774, cited supra note 1, Art. 4(1).
203. BVerfGWeiss, cited supra note 31, para 94.
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what the duty to state reasons entails. InWeiss, the ECJ quickly dismisses the
challenge, arguing that publishing details of the period is not necessary to
explain its necessity.204 In simple terms, the ECJ does not relate the duty to
state reasons to the objective features of the PSPP, but rather to the process of
reason-giving used to justify those features. So long as adequate reasons have
been given to justify the necessity of a blackout period, the duty to state
reasons has been satisfied.
The difficulty in this regard is that the reasons given to justify the unknown
duration of the blackout period in Decision 2015/774 are very limited.As with
other parts of the judgment, both the Court and the Advocate General rely in
this regard on justifications given by the ECB in the oral hearing as well as
various “supplementary” documents provided by the ECB either before or
after the Decisions establishing the various asset purchase programmes were
made. This follows the ECJ’s practice in relation to cases brought against the
ECB in the SSM, where subsequent explanations given by the Administrative
Board of Review (an internal review body within the ECB) were accepted by
the ECJ as evidence that the duty to state reasons had been met (in spite of the
confidential nature of the hearings of that board).205
It is questionable whether even a rather informed affected individual could
piece such disparate documents together in order to fully understand the
reasons behind the establishment of the PSPP (giving weight to the notion that
such reasons should be elaborated within the acts establishing such
programmes themselves). In this sense, the ECJ’s expansion of the range of
methods through which the duty to state reasons can be evidenced could be
seen as an ambivalent step.
5.5. Lessons for judicial interactions
As briefly outlined above, the different heads of review developed and applied
by the Bundesverfassungsgericht forced the Court of Justice to take notice of
national constitutional concerns and adjust its case law accordingly. Still,
challenging the jurisprudence of the ECJ may be problematic. As put by
Advocate General Cruz Villalón: “it seems to me an all but impossible task to
preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it is to be made subject to an
absolute reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the discretion of each of the
Member States, which takes the form of a category described as
‘constitutional identity’”.206 While these fears have not yet materialized in
204. Judgment, para 43.
205. See Dawson, Maricut-Akbik and Bobic´, op. cit. supra note 131, p. 28.
206. Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, EU:C:2015:7, para 59.
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practice, the decision under analysis bears importance for possible clashes
between national constitutional courts and the ECJ.
It has already been mentioned that this is the second preliminary reference
submitted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Constitutional courts across the
EU are in general rarely submitting preliminary references, opting rather for
indirect procedural routes to send their message across,207 with the notable
exception of the Belgian Constitutional Court.208 One reason is that the very
structure of the preliminary reference procedure leaves the constitutional
court with only the most extreme option of disregarding the ECJ’s decision
should it find it contrary to the national constitution. Understandably, the ECJ
has consistently underlined the importance of judicial cooperation put into
effect through the preliminary reference procedure,209 which the ECJ would
be wise not to disregard when trusted with a preliminary reference from a
national constitutional court. Judicial interactions in the EU bring about
important benefits and have through the history of European integration
pushed the ECJ to increase its standards when reviewing EU action.210 From
a de lege ferenda perspective, visible from this reference, national courts can
provide the impetus for substantive review of ECB action to be carried out by
the EU Courts.
National courts can also ensure the coherence of such review, as this case
demonstrates. By holding the Court of Justice to its standards, national courts
are able to create long-term legitimate expectations, and ultimately, contribute
to the uniformity and coherence of EU law (an important consideration for all
those who rely on ECB action). What should be noted from the preliminary
references concerning ECB action, both in the monetary and the supervisory
arms, is that in all of them the Court of Justice provided an interpretation in
favour of the ECB position.211
Furthermore, the preliminary reference procedure has the inevitable
advantage of providing judicial protection to the individual, who is often
underrepresented in cases concerning ECB competences, which are
207. For an analysis, see Bobic´, “Constitutional pluralism is not dead: An analysis of
interactions between the European Court of Justice and constitutional courts of Member
States”, 18 GLJ (2017), 1395; Martinico, “Judging in the multilevel legal order: Exploring the
techniques of ‘hidden dialogue’”, 21 King’s College Law Journal (2010), 257.
208. Leading with 34 preliminary references submitted. Court of Justice, 2017 Annual
Report on Judicial Activity, available at <curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2018-04/_ra_2017_en.pdf> (last visited 28 May 2019), 123.
209. E.g. Case C-283/81, Cilfit, EU:C:1982:335, para 7.
210. The area of fundamental rights review is the obvious suspect for describing how the
Bundesverfassungsgericht pressured the ECJ into applying a higher standard for fundamental
rights review.
211. The present judgment; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler; Case C-219/17, Berlusconi and
Fininvest; Case C-52/17, VTB Bank (Austria).
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dominated by direct actions.212 As famously stated back in 1986 in Les Verts,
the preliminary reference procedure is part of a complete system of judicial
remedies designed to permit the ECJ to review EU measures.213 Its specific
importance for the protection of rights of individuals was explicitly
underlined by the ECJ on numerous occasions214 and is of importance not just
to the Court but to the wider legitimacy of the EU legal order. Using judicial
review, and the preliminary reference procedure, to re-locate the individual in
EMU (a policy field otherwise dominated by States and EU institutions) could
yet constitute a major contribution of judicial review to the wider
accountability of the EU.
Despite the benefits of the preliminary reference procedure, constitutional
courts are not always in a position to submit a reference, and in the majority of
cases, they reserve the final decision for themselves. It is in these situations
that a conflict in interpretation between the EU and the national level may
arise. The PSPP reference is a good example of a national court attempting to
hold the ECJ to abide by its own standards, and equally to respect the limits of
EU law. While it is impossible at this point to know whether the
Bundesverfassungsgericht will accept the decision of the ECJ, it has, already
in its reference, provided certain safeguards in case of disagreement. Before
detailing the standard of review it will apply to the PSPP, it stated that “the
obligation incumbent on the Federal Constitutional Court to pursue
substantiated complaints of an ultra vires act on the part of the European
bodies and institutions is to be coordinated with the task which the Treaties
confer on the Court of Justice”.215 The German Court then sets out the
relationship between the principle of primacy and the Basic Law, addressing
also the identity and ultra vires review it carries out in relation to EU acts. The
conclusion is that any such review must be done cautiously, with restraint, and
in a way that is open to European integration.216
Regardless of the many advantages of the preliminary reference procedure,
it is regrettably possible to observe that the two courts are not so much
meaningfully talking to, as much as past each other. This is visible from the
back and forth exchange concerning the nature and extent of judicial
review of ECB action in the monetary field. On the one hand, when assessing
whether the objectives of the PSPP fall within monetary policy, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht appears to find the information provided by the
212. Court of Justice, 2017 Annual Report on Judicial Activity, cited supra note 208, 106.
213. Case C-294/83, Les Verts, EU:C:1986:166, para 23.
214. See e.g. Opinion 2/13, ECHR, para 176; Case C-50/00 P, UPA, EU:C:2002:462, para
40; Case C-491/01, BAT and Imperial Tobacco, EU:C:2002:741, para 39.
215. BVerfG Weiss, cited supra note 31, para 56.
216. Ibid., paras. 121, 154 and 156.
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ECB insufficient to allow for judicial review.217 On the other hand, when
addressing the prohibition of monetary financing, the German Court finds the
available information to hinder the need for uncertainty on the secondary
market.218 The Court of Justice, with the aim of opposing both propositions,
falls into an analogous inconsistency: the information provided is enough for
the Court to be able to review its objectives as regards monetary policy,219 but
not enough to provide certainty on the market and breach the prohibition on
monetary financing.220
In addition, the Court of Justice on its part provided very little input as
regards a possible rejection of its decision by the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
restating its well-established case law on the binding nature of preliminary
rulings,221 despite the possibility left open in the reference for the German
court to disregard a decision contrary to German constitutional identity. From
the perspective of avoiding conflict, this tactic from Gauweiler has proved
useful, as any interference by the ECJ in sensitive national constitutional
matters may ultimately breach the obligation of the EU to respect national
identities of Member States, as set out in Article 4(2) TEU. Nevertheless,
taking into consideration that the Bundesverfassungsgericht has now twice
raised serious concerns, emphasizing the importance of German
constitutional identity relating to the budgetary powers of the Bundestag, the
ECJ will at a certain point need to define the room for manoeuvre available to
the ECB when implementing large-scale programmes such as the PSPP at the
expense of national budgetary powers.
6. Conclusion
The euro crisis has dramatically influenced not only the economic strength of
the EU and euro, but has left a permanent mark on its institutional structure.
The Weiss litigation described and analysed in this note thus has significant
consequences for the position of the ECB in carrying out its tasks accorded by
the Treaties. It will determine the delicate balance between the discretion and
independence necessary to perform its tasks successfully on the one hand, and
the accountability mechanisms in place to keep the ECB in check, on the other.
In that sense, the judgment also contributes to determining the standards of
legal accountability in the economic and monetary field more generally, and
217. Ibid., para 114.
218. Ibid., para 80.
219. E.g. Judgment, paras. 88–89.
220. Ibid., paras. 111 and 113–127.
221. Ibid., para 19.
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in particular in relation to the level of accountability required by constitutional
law at the national level.
The common thread behind these different aspects of the case is that
ultimately the ECJ will do, and appears to have done, whatever it takes to save
the euro. It has allowed for a wide reading of the ECB’s monetary policy
mandate, without engaging in a more substantive review of the reasoning
provided by the ECB. The Court has also accepted all safeguards provided by
the ECB to satisfy the prohibition of monetary financing from Article 123(1)
TFEU without questioning the information provided by the ECB, or
contrasting it to other sources of expertise. It has further applied a narrow
procedural version of proportionality review confined to assessing the ECB’s
duty to state reasons. All these findings from Weiss will have long-term
effects on the constitutional position of the ECB, with the Court going a long
way to strengthening the position of the ECB over time. In doing so, the ECJ
also potentially endangers its collaborative relationship with the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, as well as national courts more generally. One
unanticipated consequence of this litigation may be an additional reluctance
on the part of national courts to submit preliminary references. The answer to
any question related to ECB activity (at least on monetary questions) seems to
be known in advance.
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